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• A generic dependability model for System Protection Schemes (SPS) is proposed.
• The model is embedded in a cost–benefit framework for optimal system operation.
• Significant cost savings are possible even with an unreliable SPS.
• Optimal operational strategies are closely linked to the failures modes of the SPS.
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a b s t r a c t
The power transfer capability of existing transmission networks can be enhanced through the use of
automated system protection schemes (SPS), which rapidly respond to disturbances on the network to
keep the system’s variables within operational bounds. However, reliance on such schemes may expose
the network to large impacts – including blackouts – if the SPS does not respond as designed, so the
deployment of SPS should balance risks and benefits. This paper formulates a risk-based cost–benefit
framework that allows the operator to strike an optimal balance between constraint costs and risks of
demand curtailment due to malfunctioning SPS. It is applied to a simple 4-bus power system inspired
by the GB network, for which an exact optimisation problem can be formulated. A component-based
dependability model is developed for the SPS to determine its failure modes and associated probabilities.
The resulting cost-minimisation problem is solved for a range of operating conditions and SPS reliability
levels. The results consistently show cost savings from the use of an SPS, even if it is highly unreliable,
when a hedging strategymay be used. The optimal solution is highly sensitive to the problem parameters,
but it is demonstrated that optimal operational strategies are associated with particular SPS outcomes.
This finding may be used as empirical guidance to develop operational strategies for complex networks
with unreliable SPS.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
System Protection Schemes (SPS), also known as System
Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) or Remedial Action Schemes
(RAS), are systems designed to detect abnormal power system
conditions and initiate predetermined corrective actions to
mitigate the impact of abnormal operating conditions, usually
triggered by contingencies [1]. SPS interventions include changes
in load, generation, or system topology, usually mediated by
ICT infrastructure. These corrective systems help to protect the
power system from high-impact low-probability events, including
cascading failures [2].
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of security—usually as part of last-resort defence plans, but they
can also improve economic utilisation of electricity networks, alle-
viating operational security constraints. In this second application,
they provide corrective security, which should be contrasted to the
traditional preventive approach in which security is guaranteed
through redundant transmission infrastructure [3]. Operationally,
a preventive security approach results in high operational costs,
especially when large amounts of remote renewable resources are
connected to the grid: the pre-fault security constraints may re-
quire costly curtailments of renewables and dispatching genera-
tors out of merit [4]. In the planning time frame, this paradigm
provides an incentive to invest in costly transmission reinforce-
ments [5].
For these reasons, there has been growing interest in exploring
and expanding the application of SPS to release extra capacity to
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Brazil and Chile. Indeed, a recent survey by IEEE and PSERC [7]
on global experiences with SPS shows an increase in the use of
such schemes. However, SPS actions are not infallible in practice,
and relying on them means exposing the system to additional
risks resulting from SPS malfunction. If such failures occur, they
may drive the system far outside its regular operating regime,
potentially triggering harmful blackouts. Therefore, the increasing
use of these schemes needs to be accompanied by a better
understanding of their true impact, as undesirable SPS operations
may result in a deterioration of the overall system reliability.
SPSmalfunctions are not as infrequent as onemay think. Panteli
et al. [8] reviewed NERC System Disturbance Reports from 1986
to 2009 and found that of 26 SPS malfunctions, 11 cases were
related to ICT operational failures. SPS malfunctions have also
played a role in Europe, as happened in the Nordic network in
2005 [1]. Moreover, in a 1996 IEEE-CIGRE survey [9], respondents
from the power industry assigned very high cost estimates to
SPS failures. This underscores the necessity of a robust decision
framework for SPS operation that takes into account SPS failure
modes and their likelihood of occurrence. SPS failures are classified
into dependability-based (failure to operate when required)
and security-based (accidental activations). Dependability failures
typically receive the most attention in protection system design
and system studies, because failure of a protection system to
operate when the system is in a state that requires it, is likely to
have significant consequences [10].
Despite the potential risks from SPS malfunctions, the opera-
tional rules for these systems have historically been determined
based on deterministic techniques combined with expert judge-
ment [1]. In recent years, probabilistic analysis has increasingly
been used to address uncertainties in pre-fault operating con-
ditions (e.g. demand levels, outages, variable generation, etc.).
Hydro-Quebec [11,12] has performed simulations based on histor-
ical snapshots and made use of techniques such as data mining
and combinatorial optimisation to optimise the settings of genera-
tion and load shedding protection systems [11,12]. Similarly, Hsiao
et al. [13], and Wen-Ta and Chao-Rong [14] perform simulations
under different operating conditions to optimise SPS settings in the
Taiwan power system. Another example is BC Hydro [1] which has
implemented an arming scheme for multiple SPS such as genera-
tion intertripping using off-line Monte Carlo simulations. All these
efforts have resulted in robust rules for SPS operation based on a
sensible coverage of operating conditions and contingencies, but
dependable SPS operation has commonly been assumed for these
studies.
Integrating the risks caused by unreliable SPS into power
system operations is a challenging task, due to the large number
of possible scenarios and the difficulty involved in modelling
the consequences of SPS malfunctions. A generic risk assessment
for SPS based on FMEA and Markov modelling is presented
in Fu et al. [15], where the authors focus on computing the
optimal arming point of a generation rejection scheme. Panteli
and Crossley [16] also calculate optimal arming points that
balance the risks stemming from a lack of dependability and
accidental activations. These works are concerned with risk-
based optimal configuration of SPS. However, the computation
of impacts from SPS malfunction scenarios has commonly not
included the response of the power system in complex post-fault
scenarios. The latter is often highly nonlinear, for example when
themalfunction triggers a cascading outage. Besides, the risks from
unreliable SPS operation should be embedded in a system-level
cost–benefit analysis, so that it is accounted for in operational
decisions regarding dispatch and the loading of transmission
lines. Ultimately, such a framework seeks to balance benefits and
risks associated with different levels of network utilisation andinvestment, as in the case of probabilistic security standards [17].
Moreno et al. [4] have presented an initial investigation of this
topic, but their analysis included only a very simple model of SPS
malfunction and its impacts.
SPS use long-range communication and automated decisions to
improve the control of the physical electricity grid. As such, they
form an excellentmodel system to study the complexities involved
in the modelling and operation of cyber–physical energy and
communication systems. The development of reliability analysis
methods for such systems is an open research challenge [18].
This paper makes a number of contributions towards the risk-
aware operation of power systems using unreliable SPS:
• We formally state the decision problem faced by the operator
to simultaneously optimise the dispatch of generators and the
arming of the unreliable SPS, introducing the different cost
components of the objective function (Section 2).
• A simple four-bus model system is introduced to demonstrate
the salient properties of this optimisation challenge. The model
is sufficiently simple to allow a closed form expression for the
optimisation (Section 3 (model) and Section 4 (optimisation)).
• The model makes use of a high-level SPS dependability
model, based on generic components (relay, communication
channel, logic controller, breaker), the results of which are
summarised by a conditional probability table for the SPS
response (Section 4).
• Section 5.1 investigates the properties of the optimal dispatch
and SPS configuration, across a range of operating conditions
and SPS reliability scenarios. The results demonstrate the robust
ability of even an unreliable SPS to contribute to a reduction in
system costs, often through hedging against (partial) failures.
• We demonstrate that the optimal SPS configuration, for any
dispatch, is a member of a discrete set of candidate solutions,
which are associated with specific SPS outcome (including its
failure modes). This finding is likely to be beneficial for the
development of efficient optimisation methods for large power
systems.
It should be noted that the framework presented in Section 2
is widely applicable, but implementing such a framework for large
networks that may suffer complex cascading outages is far from
trivial. The implementation in Sections 3 and 4 stops short of that
long term aim by focusing on a simple network configuration. The
transparency of this model enables an in-depth understanding of
the properties of the solutions (Section 5). Such understandingwill
contribute to the future development of generalised methods that
can be applied to complex power systems.
2. Problem statement
We consider the problem of optimal system operation from the
perspective of a single central operator in a congested network
with pre-contingency security constraints. In the operational
time frame, the operator must decide on the optimal dispatch
of generators to minimise operational costs. In addition, it can
configure and arm an SPS to relax security constraints. Efficient
operation of the system is achieved by co-optimising the dispatch
and SPS configuration in a way that balances the benefits from the
utilisation of low-cost generation (e.g. wind) and the risks due to
contingencies and unreliable SPS operation.
Fig. 1 illustrates the operational decision problem. We assume
that the operator has no recourse after a contingency occurs, so
that the dispatch and SPS configuration fully define the system’s
response to faults.We further assume that contingencies unrelated
to the SPS are neutralised by a security constrained OPF as part
of the dispatch so that only SPS-related contingencies need to be
considered.
100 J.L. Calvo et al. / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 8 (2016) 98–110Fig. 1. Elements of the operational decision framework with unreliable SPS.
The operational costs are analysed using a three-stage decom-
position of the power system response to faults. The first stage is
steady state operation, which characterises the pre-fault state. This
stage is associated with two deterministic cost elements: (1) vari-
able generation costs G (£/h); (2) availability fees Pa (£/h) for sys-
temprotection services, including the availability/arming fee of the
SPS.
The second stage, SPS action and system response, is triggered by
the stochastic occurrence of a contingency. SPS activation causes
generators to trip and spinning reserve services to be deployed
in order to neutralise the resultant generation shortage. The costs
associated with this stage are the protection utilisation costs
Pu (£/event). Note that this is a random variable, characterised by
uncertainties relating to the stochastic occurrence of contingencies
and the potential for SPS malfunctions.
The third and final stage is end user impact. SPS malfunctions
or operational choices can result in post-fault overloads that trip
transmission lines, possibly in a cascading manner. The impact
on supply to end users is summarised by the loss of load cost
L (£/event).
Taken together, this allows us to define a probabilistic
cost–benefit framework. The operator identifies dispatch decisions
D and SPS decisions S that minimise the total cost C–or more
specifically the expected cost E [C] (for a risk neutral system
operator):
min
D,S
E [C] = min
D,S
G (D)+ Pa (D, S)
+ E Pu (D, S)+ E[L (D, S)]
≡ min
D,S
G+ P + X (1)
where P and X are the expected protection and loss-of-load costs,
respectively. The optimisation is subject to constraints relating to
power flows, the generation dispatch, etc.
The optimisation framework presents two challenges. First, the
set of possible SPS outcomes can be very large, and depends on the
decision variables (generator dispatch and SPS configuration). The
explicit consideration of all possible SPS outcomes for all possible
SPS configurations can be prohibitive for large systems. Second,
in a general setting, computing the load-shedding costs L requiresdetailed analysis of a complex power system. The costs may, for
example, depend on the outcome of a cascading process that
includes random hidden failures of local protection systems [19].
When complex cascading pathways are involved in the power
system response to faults, an algebraic formulation of the costs
is typically not available, and the impact can only realistically be
evaluated by explicit simulation of individual events and operating
points.
In the remainder of this paper we analyse a simple 2 + 2
bus model where an exact expression for X = E [L] exists.
Although this direct approach to solving (1) cannot be extended
to large systems, it provides insight into the challenges involved
in formulating and solving this problem. Specifically, we identify
properties of the solutions that provide guidance for the future
development of heuristic optimisation schemes for larger systems.
The discussion above considers a single decision under constant
system conditions. This decision process can be repeated on a
rolling basis (e.g. half-hourly) for long-term system operation.
See [20] for an example of this approach. In the following, only
a single operational snapshot is considered, to focus on the
properties of the elementary decision problem itself.
3. Model definition
3.1. Model description
The challenging task of co-optimising generation dispatch and
the configuration of an unreliable SPS will be illustrated using a
simple model system. The model is inspired by the situation in the
GB power system, where most demand is situated in England and
Wales, whereas Scotland offers the best locations for wind power
generation. The Scotland–England transmission corridor consists
of two existing (AC) double circuits, which are scheduled to be
supplemented by two off-shore HVDC lines in order to increase
the power transfers [21,22]. The overall planned transmission
investment to accommodate new wind power projects amounts
to approximately £15 billion (2010–2020) [5], thus illustrating the
potential value of making better use of existing assets.
The model power system is shown in Fig. 2; it has two major
busbars, labelled North and South. The North bus has a large
amount of installed wind capacity and only limited local demand,
creating an economic incentive for a net North–South power
flow. The power flows downstream through two identical double
circuits, each divided in two sections. The representation then
has a total of eight identical lines (L1 . . . L8), each with a circuit
rating of 1700 MW [4]. We restrict our analysis to active power
flows – ignoring losses – and do not consider dynamical or voltage
constraints. In the absence of an SPS, we will assume that the
transmission lines are subject to an ‘N-1’ security standard, where
the system must be able to continue normal operations after the
loss of any single or double circuit (also known as ‘N-d’). Assuming
identical double circuits and a lack of corrective control actions,
only 50% of the network capacity can be released to the users,
resulting in frequent curtailment of wind power generation in the
North bus.
A generation rejection scheme is connected to two intermediate
buses, namedWest and East. After any line fault (single or double),
this SPS aims to disconnect the faulted lines and remotely trip a
predetermined amount of wind generation connected to the North
node. These actions have the objective of isolating the faulted
lines and reducing the load on remaining lines. Frequency services
from generators located in South are relied on to restore the
balance between load and generation (see also Section 3.3). The
amount of generation to be disconnectedmay therefore not exceed
the frequency response capability of the network. The base case
considers a minimum of 1800 MW to deal with large generator
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Generation data.
Gen. technology No. of units North No. of units South Variable cost (£/MWh) Min. stable gen. (MW) Max. reserve unit (MW)
Wind Variable 0 0 0 0
Nuclear 5 20 0 450 0
Base gas 0 24 30 200 200
Base coal 1 27 35 200 200
Interconnector 0 4 50 0 0
Water 2 0 80 50 200
Marginal gas 3 21 90 200 200
Marginal coal 6 23 100 200 200
Pump storage 1 3 200 50 200
Oil 0 7 210 200 200
Peakers 0 2 300 200 200Fig. 2. Four bus representation of the GB network. An SPS is connected to increase
the power transfer.
outages [21], but the system operator may additionally acquire up
to 1000MWof extra capacity, if this is beneficial for overall system
operation. The SPS is triggered by both single and double circuit
faults but does not differentiate between them.
In order to focus on generic problems related to SPS reliability
we consider a basic SPS that disconnects a defined amount of wind
power s, equally distributed across n independent sites connected
to the North bus. The system operator balances the system’s risk
profile by selecting suitable values of s and n, in conjunction with a
pre-fault generation dispatch. Table 1 shows the installed capacity
and cost parameters αi of different types of generating units, based
on data from [4]. To simplify the optimisation model, we use an
average generating unit size of 500 MW for all technologies.
Single and double circuit faults are modelled as Poisson
processes with rates λs and λd (occurrences/hour), respectively.
Representative values for fair and bad weather are shown in
Table 2.
3.2. SPS dependability model
The SPS is not 100% dependable (i.e. can fail to operate when
called upon). Fig. 3 shows the structure of the basic SPS model,
based on generic properties of such corrective systems [1,6,23].
Input signals (line faults) on the left are propagated throughTable 2
Fault rates.
Source: Illustrative fault rates, based on data from [4].
Weather scenario Fault order Fault rate (occ./h)
Fair Single λs = 3× 10
−5
Double λd = 3× 10−6
Bad Single λs = 1× 10
−3
Double λd = 1× 10−4
a block if it has not suffered a hidden failure. When a signal
reaches a Gi symbol on the right, the corresponding generator is
disconnected. The scheme includes physical connections toN wind
farms, but only n ≤ N connections are armed at any given time,
at the operator’s discretion. The dependability model is similar to
the Reliability Block Diagram/Network Model approach [24], but
unlike that approach the diagram in Fig. 3 has multiple inputs and
outputs, and a single connected path does not necessarily qualify
as a ‘success’.
The components of the SPS are of the type:
• Relay (R1 . . . R8): connected to a particular line (L1 . . . L8), it
identifies when a fault occurs in its line, transmits a trip signal
‘TS’ to its local breaker and a fault signal ‘FS’ to its local logic
control.
• Logic control (LCW, LCE): makes the decision to remotely trip
generation. It acts as an OR logic gate, and broadcasts a trip
signal to the remote breakers upon receiving a fault signal from
any one of the relays. The signal is only broadcast to the n ≤ N
generators that have been pre-selected by the system operator.
• Communication channel (CW,1 . . . CW,N, CE,1 . . . CE,N): trans-
mits the trip signal to the remote breakers.
• Circuit Breaker (B1 . . . B8, BG1 . . . BGN): opens a circuit (line,
generator) upon receiving an open signal. Circuit breakers that
act locally to trip a line are referred to as local breakers in this
paper. Circuit breakers that act remotely to trip generation are
called remote breakers.
Let us suppose that a fault occurs on line L1. In a normal
operation of the SPS, the relevant relay (R1) identifies the fault
and sends a trip signal to its local breaker (B1). This action then
trips the faulted line (L1). At the same time, R1 sends a signal
to the logic control (LCw) which broadcasts a trip signal through
the communication channels associated with the generators that
had been previously selected (Cw,1 . . . Cw,n). The trip signals reach
the remote breakers which finally trip the targeted generators
(BG1 . . . BGn).
However, malfunctioning SPS components can result in abnor-
mal operation. For example, themalfunction of the communication
channel associated with one of the n selected generators results in
a loss of a fraction 1/n of the scheduled SPS capacity. For the com-
munication channels we consider an illustrative average availabil-
ity (0.95 by default), which will be varied for sensitivity analysis in
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yellow. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)later sections. The dependability of the other components is mod-
elled using a hidden failure model. Their average availability is de-
termined using a constant failure rate and regular (independent)
inspections during which any faulty component is repaired [25].
Average availabilities are estimated using a first order approxima-
tion as:
ai = 1− ai = 1− λi Ti2 (2)
where
ai is the availability of component i
ai is the unavailability of component i
λi is the failure rate of component type i (failures/year)
Ti is the time between maintenance inspections of component
type i (years).
The component availabilities (Table 3) are computed assuming a
time between inspections of 6 months. It must be noted that any
event that triggers SPS activation also constitutes an inspection,
as malfunctioning components will be identified by their failure
to operate. Therefore, if the SPS is triggered at a rate similar to or
larger than the inspection frequency, the inter-inspection time Ti
should be adjusted for these activations. A constant value is used
for the component availabilities, consistent with our analysis of
a single operational snapshot. For applications to rolling decision
problems, the reliability parameters could vary with time, and
potentially depend on load conditions.
We assume that the SPS has a protective back-up system that
clears the faulted lines if the main breakers (B1 . . . B8) fail to do
so [26]. This, however, always involves the loss of the whole bus to
which the faulted lines are connected. Returning to our example,
should B1 fail to isolate L1 from the system, the back-up system
would actuate and isolate the eastern intermediate bus.Table 3
SPS component availability.
Source: Relay and breaker failure rates as in Allan and Adraktas [25].
Component Failure rate (events/year) Availability
Relay λr = 0.075 0.981
Logic control λlc = 0.03 0.9925
Breaker λb = 0.008 0.9980
3.3. Cost of SPS (mis)operation
From the power system perspective, unintentional SPS out-
comes can result in a sequence of events that are ultimately associ-
ated with a cost to the operators or users of the system. In keeping
with our basic model we use a quasi-steady state assumption.
The operation of the SPS results in a net power imbalance
whenever at least one of the generating sites is successfully
tripped. In such a situation, frequency-sensitive generators will
restore the power balance within seconds, before any further
action in the form of load shedding is triggered. Frequency
services are assumed to be deployed in the South node with a
minimum capacity of 1800 MW, which is required to protect the
system against the sudden loss of the largest generating unit.
We assume that response and reserve capacity is purchased at a
price πa [£/MW/h], and additional capacity beyond the minimum
amount of 1800 MW can be optionally purchased to provide
headroom for additional SPS intertripping capacity. In the latter
case, πa represents an effective availability fee for frequency
regulation driven by the SPS. In addition, there is an SPS utilisation
fee, consisting of payments πu [£/MW/event] to disconnected
generators.
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Costs associated with faults.
Parameter Explanation Cost
πa Cost of frequency response availability 30 £/MW/h
πu Cost of SPS generator disconnection 1000 £/MW/event
πx Cost of customer disconnection 30000 £/MW/event
System prices as used in Moreno et al. [4] and assuming interruption durations of
1 h.
After the generation–demand balance is restored, it is assumed
that the north–south power flow is evenly distributed over the
remaining lines. The total transfer capacity is therefore equal toN×
1700MW,whereN is the number of parallel circuits that remain in
service. If, after SPS operation and frequency response, the power
flow exceeds the post-fault transfer capacity this will trigger a
disconnection of the remaining lines. Note that this condition will
usually result from a (partial) SPS malfunction, but in rare cases it
may be economically advantageous to accept disconnections even
when the SPS operates as designed.
Disconnection of the corridor splits the system, separating
the north and south nodes. This new topology necessitates a
second restoration to balance generation and demand within
each node (electrical island). In this case, frequency services
are exhausted before emergency defence plans are invoked,
triggering involuntary load and generator shedding. The capacity
for emergency generation and load shedding is assumed to be
unlimited and of the required granularity. The cost associated
with customer disconnections is πx [£/MW/event]—restoration is
implied, but not explicitly modelled. There is no cost associated
with emergency generator disconnection. The numbers used in our
study are listed in Table 4.
In our basic model, the loss of the transmission corridor
following incorrect operation of the SPS will lead to system
splitting and necessary demand curtailment. This is special
case of a more general phenomenon where an initial fault is
compounded by an inappropriate corrective response. As a result,
the power system can find itself significantly outside the range
of safe operating conditions, which may lead to an uncontrollable
cascading outage that can result in a complete blackout.
4. Methods
This section develops the formal optimisation model that
represents efficient operation and SPS configuration for the system
described in Section 3. For clarity, the notation used is summarised
in Table 5.
4.1. Probabilistic SPS outcomes
The component-level SPS model described in Section 3.2 has
inherent symmetries that can be exploited to simplify its analysis.
Instead of modelling all possible line outages and malfunctions of
the SPS components individually, it is sufficient to consider one
single and one double line outage with appropriately scaled fault
rates and convert the original SPS topology to a simplified block
diagram. This is justified because:
• all SPS components of the same typehave identical availabilities
• the SPS acts in the same way for any line outage of the same
order, namely single and double faults, regardless of where it
occurs
• all single line faults are equivalent, independent from each
other and are assumed not to occur at the same time, and the
same applies to double line faults.Fig. 4. Simplified SPS model.
We further reduce the complexity of the initial SPS by
integrating the availability of the generator-connected circuit
breaker block with that of its respective communication channel
block. Finally, the simplified SPS model, shown in Fig. 4, includes
exclusively the n generators that the system operator selects to
participate in the scheme at a given time (n ≤ N).
The outcomes of the SPS are characterised by the loss of one or
two lines (local actions) as well as the number of generators that
successfully trip (remote actions). The local actions are indicated
by the label l ∈ {s, d}, where s and d represent single or double
circuit outages, respectively. Because the intertripping capacity is
allocated evenly among the selected generators, the remote actions
can be summarised by the number m ∈ {0, . . . , n} of generating
sites that was successfully disconnected. The 2(n + 1) possible
outcomes of SPS action can thus be represented by the pair (l,m).
The SPS can be triggered by single and double line faults, which
means that the outcome probabilities are conditional on these
events. The probabilistic dependability model is thus summarised
by Table 6, which lists the conditional probabilities plm/n|e of the
outcome (l,m) for an initiating event e ∈ {es, ed} (single or double
circuit fault) and given value of n. Note that the loss of a double
circuit (l = d) can be triggered directly by a double circuit fault
(e = ed) or by a single circuit fault (e = es) followed by the failure
of the local breaker to isolate the faulted line. The opposite – loss
of a single circuit as a result of a double line fault – does not occur.
We now compute the probabilities of the different SPS
outcomes upon the occurrence of a single line fault (es). We first
analyse the case m = 0 in which none of the selected generators
trip. The conditional probabilities for a single or double circuit
outage are:
ps0/n|es = aRaB

aLC +aLC anCB

(3)
pd0/n|es = aRaB

aLC +aLC anCB
+ aR. (4)
Form ≠ 0 we find:
psm/n|es = aRaBaLC

n
m

amCBa
(n−m)
CB (5)
pdm,n|es = aRaBaLC

n
m

amCBa
(n−m)
CB . (6)
Next, we determine the probabilities of SPS outcomes upon
a double circuit fault event (ed). After the occurrence of a
double circuit fault the local bus (Western or Eastern) will be
disconnected, either by correct operation of the local breakers
or by operation of the back-up breakers. We first calculate the
probability that a signal is successfully sent from the logic control.
This requires at least one of the relays and the logic controller to
function correctly:
p(ts)|ed = (ar1ar2 + ar1ar2 + ar1ar2) alc . (7)
As before, we treat separately the cases m = 0 and m ≠ 0.
Using p(ts)|ed, the probabilities of each SPS outcome conditional on
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Nomenclature.
Label Description Unit
Decision variables
s Contracted SPS capacity MW
n Number of contracted SPS sites
ui Pre-fault commitment of generator i (binary)
gi Pre-fault output of generator i MW
1gi Frequency response allocation to generator i MW
Parameters
plm/n|e Conditional probability of SPS outcome l,m
λs, λd Single, double circuit fault rates 1/h
DN ,DS Demand in north, south nodes MW
t Pre-fault flow constraint MW
g
i
, g i Minimum/maximum generation levels of generator i MW
1gi Maximum response/reserve allocation to generator i MW
αi Generation cost of generator i £/MWh
πa Cost of frequency response availability £/MW/h
πu, πx Cost of generator, customer disconnection £/MW/event
1t Time window of optimisation hour
Auxiliary variables
G Generation costs £/h
P Expected protection costs £/h
X Expected load shedding costs £/h
t Pre-fault north–south power flow MW
r Total frequency response/reserve allocation MW
δl,m Occurrence of overload in the (l,m) fault scenario (binary)
η Positive post-reserve transfer requirement (binary)
Indices
e ∈ {es, ed} Initiating event (single, double circuit fault)
l ∈ {s, d} Post-SPS line status (single, double circuit outage)
m ∈ {0, . . . , n} Number of responsive SPS sitesTable 6
Probabilistic outcome table.
Event Local actions Remote actions (generating sites tripped)
0 1 . . . N
Single Single ps0/n|es ps1/n|es · · · psn/n|es
Double pd0/n|es pd1/n|es · · · pdn/n|es
Double Double pd0/n|ed pd1/n|ed · · · pdn/n|ed
the event ed and number of sites n are:
pd0/n|ed = p(ts) + p(ts)anCB (8)
pdm/n|ed = p(ts)

n
m

amCBa
(n−m)
CB ; m ≠ 0. (9)
4.2. Cost and constraint formulation
Ultimately, the SPS is part of the system operator’s toolbox
that provides additional options to reduce operational costs. The
SPS failure and impact models thus form part of a probabilistic
optimisation problem that determines the optimal dispatch of
generators jointly with an SPS configuration. This minimisation is
subject to the definitions and constraints listed below.
(1) Generation (G)
The cost of generation G is defined as a linear function of the
dispatched output gi of generator i:
G ≡ G ({gi}) =

i
αigi1t. (10)
A time step 1t = 1 hour is assumed throughout. The dispatched
generating capacity should equal the demand in theNorth (DN ) andSouth (DS) nodes combined:
i
gi = DN + DS (11)
subject to physical transfer constraints on the North–South flow t:
t =

i∈North
gi − DN (12)
t ≤ t. (13)
The commitment of generating units is modelled as follows:
gi ≥ g iui (14)
gi +△g i ≤ g iui (15)
where ui represents the binary commitment status of each
generator and 1gi the reserve capability from part-loaded
generators. We assume that this is provided by generators in the
South, and it is constrained by
0 ≤ 1gi ≤ △g i ∀i ∈ South (16)
1gi = 0 ∀i ∈ North (17)
i
1gi = r (18)
1800 MW ≤ r ≤ 2800 MW (19)
where r is the allocated frequency response and reserve capacity
and△g i represents the reserve limit of unit i. The minimum value
of r is 1800 MW, but the system operator may decide to contract
up to 1000 MW of additional intertripping and reserve capacity if
this is beneficial for the overall cost minimisation. The additional
capacity may be used to relax constraints on the intertripping
capacity s, which is limited by
0 ≤ s ≤ r. (20)
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The system protection cost P represents the expected hourly
cost of system protection services, consisting of frequency
response and SPS availability fees and SPS utilisation fees. The
availability cost is determined in advance by purchasing a response
capacity r at a fee πa of £30/MW/h. This fee implies that
the response capacity will only exceed 1800 MW if there is a
corresponding security benefit from arming a significant amount
of SPS capacity (s > 1800 MW).
The actual SPS utilisation fees are unknown, as they depend
on the stochastic occurrence of outages and the actual amount of
generation tripped in response to these outages. For this reason,
the expected utilisation cost is included in P . Successfully tripped
generation capacity is compensated with a utilisation fee πu of
£1000/MW/event. The total rates (occurrences/hour) for each type
of occurrence are λtotes = 8λs (λs for each circuit) and λtoted = 4λd
(λd for each double circuit). Therefore
P ≡ P (r, s, n) = 1tπar
+1t πus

e∈{es,ed}
λtote

l∈{s,d}

m∈{0...n}
m
n
plm/n|e. (21)
(3) Risk (X)
The third source of costs is the risk X due to emergency load
shedding after unsuccessful SPS operation. The risk, the expected
cost of supply interruptions, is computed by multiplying the value
of disconnections πx by their rate of occurrence and the amount of
load shed:
X ≡ X (t, r, s, n)
= 1t πx

e∈{es,ed}
λtote

l∈{s,d}
×

m∈{0...n}
plm/n|e1Dl,m(t, r, s, n). (22)
Here, 1Dl,m(t, r, s, n) represents the (deterministic) demand that
will be shed in a particular scenario. For the minimal model that
is the focus of this paper1Dl,m (t, r, s, n) has the compact explicit
representation
1Dl,m (t, r, s, n) = θ

t − m
n
s− t l

max (t − r, 0).
This expression consists of two factors. The first determines
whether or not an overload occurs. The quantity t − mn s indicates
the post-SPS power flow between the nodes and t l = Nl ×
1700 MW is the available transfer capacity, which depends on
the local SPS outcome l ∈ {s, d}: Ns = 3 for a single circuit
disconnection and Nd = 2 for a double-circuit disconnection. θ(x)
represents the unit step function that returns 1 when x > 0 and 0
otherwise.
The second factor determines the extent of the load shedding if
the north and south nodes split into separate islands. The south
node has a pre-fault generation deficit t , which can be partially
offset by the reserve capacity r . The remainder must be shed.
Within a linear optimisation framework, the value of 1Dl,m
(t, r, s, n) can be computed using binary auxiliary variables: δl,m
reflects the presence of post-SPS overload conditions andη that has
the value 1 only if (t − r) is positive. The value of1Dl,m (t, r, s, n)
is determined by the following set of equations (whereM is a largepositive constant):
t − m
n
s− t l ≤ δl,mM ∀l,m (23)
t − m
n
s− t l ≥ −

1− δl,m

M ∀l,m (24)
t − r ≤ ηM (25)
t − r ≥ − (1− η)M (26)
1Dl,m ≥ 0 ∀l,m (27)
1Dl,m ≤ δl,mM ∀l,m (28)
1Dl,m ≤ ηM ∀l,m (29)
1Dl,m ≥ t − r −

2− δl,m − η

M ∀l,m (30)
1Dl,m ≤ t − r + (1− η)M ∀l,m. (31)
Note that this leaves δl,m and η are undefined for exact equalities,
but the lower associated costs will result in δl,m = 0 and/or η = 0
in such cases.
4.3. Optimisation formulation
Having defined the cost terms G, P and X and the constraints on
the optimisation variables, the overall cost–benefit optimisation
can be stated as
min
ui,gi,1gi,s,n
G+ P + X
subject to (10)–(31).
(32)
This is a mixed integer problem, which is non-linear due
to appearance of n, the number of contracted sites, in the
denominators in (21), (23) and (24). However, for a fixed value
of n the problem (32) reduces to a mixed integer linear program.
Because the realistic range of n is small (each site requires a
separate communications channel and intertripping contract), we
solve it sequentially for each permissible value of n and select the
best solution. In the following, we use n = 1, . . . , 4.
The optimisation (32) computes an optimal trade-off between
the cost of generation, protection and risk. It is instructive to
compare the resulting cost of generation G∗ with the hypothetical
scenario where fault-related costs are not considered. The cost of
this unconstrained dispatch is computed as
G0 = min
ui,gi,1gi
G,
subject to (10)–(19).
(33)
The difference G∗ − G0 is the constraint cost: the additional
generation cost incurred in the interest of system security.
Finally, to investigate the properties of the solutions to (32)
we will also consider the restricted problem where the operator
selects an optimal SPS configuration for a given dispatch, which
fixes the pre-fault transfer condition t and response/reserve
allocation r . This results in the formal optimisation
min
s,n
[P(s, n|r)+ X(s, n|t, r)]
subject to (20)–(31).
(34)
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Optimal generation dispatch and SPS configuration
We solve the optimisation problem (32) to investigate how the
optimal cost–benefit trade-offs are affected by weather conditions
and SPS reliability. The weather conditions affect the fault rates, as
presented in Table 2, and therefore the overall risk levels. The SPS
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channels, using three scenarios: 80%, 95% and 99%. With these
numbers, communication dropouts are considerably more likely
than is commonly assumed [27], but the aim of this exercise is to
probe the sensitivity of solutions to a large range of SPS reliability
levels. For example, the analysis of unreliable communication
channels could exemplify the control of low cost providers of
ancillary services over the internet. Other component availabilities
are modelled as in Table 3. A hypothetical 100% dependable SPS
(for all components) is also included in the comparison. Local
demands of 6600 MW (north) and 48400 MW (south) are used for
all examples.
The cost–benefit trade-off is also impacted by the generation
side, which determines the constraint costs that drive the
willingness to take risks. To investigate this, we perform studies
for different available wind output levels (maximum value of wind
output) in the north node, ranging from 1.8 to 11 GW. The system
operator may curtail wind to satisfy constraints, thereby reducing
the actual power produced at the wind farms.
On the left side of Fig. 5 (upper panel), we plot the total
operating costs G + P + X as a function of the amount of wind
power available, for bad weather conditions. Different curves
correspond to different reliability levels: black: 80%; red: 95%;
blue: 99% (communications availability); green: 100% availability
of all components. The overall cost of the solutions decreases
smoothly as a function of available wind output, and increasingly
reliable SPS result in decreased operating costs. The SPS results
(solid lines) should be compared to the dashed cyan line, which
shows the cost of operating the system without SPS under the
preventive ‘N-d’ security standard (anticipation of double circuit
faults). Under this regime, costs no longer decrease after the wind
power availability reaches 6900 MW. The middle and bottom
left panels of Fig. 5 confirm that the constraint cost G∗ − G0
(computed using (33)) associated with this solution increases
sharply, primarily driven by wind power curtailment. In contrast,
the use of an SPS allows the system to make effective use of
approximately 10 GW of wind. Notably, this is true even for the
most unreliable SPS (solid black line).
The right side of Fig. 5 shows the breakdown of the objective
function into its generation, protection and loss-of-load risk
components. The generation costs are an order of magnitude
larger than the protection and risk components, and thus show
a trend that is qualitatively similar to the overall cost. The
dependable SPS (solid green) is deployed when the available wind
output reaches 4GW, resulting in an increase in protection costs
without associated risk. On the other hand, the unreliable SPS
are armed only when the available wind output exceeds 6.5 GW,
because of the risk associated with their malfunction. Their use is
accompanied by a rise in protection costs and loss-of-load risk. It is
important to note that the balance of G, P and X depends in a non-
trivial way on the available wind output and SPS dependability
parameters. For example, we observe that the most unreliable
SPS considered (the black line) results in higher overall operating
costs compared to more reliable SPS (red or blue lines), but –
for the optimal configuration – the loss-of-load risk X is actually
smaller for available wind outputs exceeding 9750 MW (bottom
right panel).
Fig. 6 plots the selected optimal SPS configuration (the
parameters n and s) as a function of available wind output. The
upper panel shows the number of armed sites n, and the bottom
panel the total SPS capacity s. Note that the value of n is not shown
for the 100% dependable SPS, because it is indeterminate (all
configurations are equally reliable). As the available wind output
increased, so did the cost of constraining transmission capacity,
thus providing an incentive to increase the SPS capacity s. Whereas
the reliable SPS (green curve) is used from available wind outputlevels of 3900MWupwards, the less reliable SPS are only employed
for higherwindpenetration levels. For availablewind output above
8000 MW it becomes increasingly desirable to contract additional
reserve and SPS capacity, for all reliability levels. In general, it
should be noted that the optimal SPS configuration depends on the
parameters in non-trivial ways.
In addition to committing redundant SPS capacity, as the
SPS configuration is co-optimised with the dispatch the system
operator may also constrain generators out of their merit order,
in order to limit the transfer in the corridor (preventive security).
In Fig. 7 we contrast the resulting pre-fault transfer capacity for
bad weather (top) and good (bottom) weather conditions. The
bad weather scenario corresponds to that analysed in Figs. 5
and 6. For fair weather conditions the occurrence of faults is
significantly less likely, and in this case the reliability level of the
SPS hardly impacts the optimal power transfer. As in Fig. 5, the ‘N-
d’ preventive security solution is shown for comparison (dashed
cyan), illustrating that SPS are used to enable significantly higher
power transfers, even in bad weather conditions with unreliable
SPS.
5.2. Candidate solutions
The previous section has demonstrated that the optimal choice
of dispatch and SPS configuration depends in complex ways on
generation and SPS reliability parameters. This section attempts to
identify generic properties of these optimal solutions, which can
be used to structure the search for such solutions in cases where
an explicit optimisation problem in the form (32) is not available.
We consider the restricted optimisation (34) where the
operator must select an optimal SPS configuration for a given
dispatch—and thus for a given pre-fault transfer condition t . The
objective function for a representative case is shown in Fig. 8,
which plots P + X as a function of s, for each of the cases n =
1, . . . , 4, with bad weather conditions, a dispatch that results
in a pre-fault transfer of 6100 MW and the minimum reserve
capacity requirement of 1800 MW. Note that in this illustration
no additional reserve capacity is purchased and therefore the cost
of increasing the SPS capacity committed does not augment the
cost of available reserve capacity. The global minimum is found for
(s, n) = (1500 MW, 3).
In our model, the protection costs P(·) (Eq. (21)) have two
regimes: s ≤ 1800 MW where no availability fee is directly
attributable to the SPS capacity and s > 1800 MW where
it requires the system operator to purchase additional reserve
capacity to counteract generation–demand imbalances beyond the
(otherwise) largest credible loss of generation. In both regimes P(·)
is linearly increasing in s. The lost load cost X(·) (Eq. (22)), on the
other hand, is dependent on whether load shedding is required.
In our power system there are only two possible scenarios: no
load shedding (1Dl,m = 0), or a complete loss of transmission in
the corridor resulting in the formation of two islands. When this
happens, the southern node has insufficient reserve capacity to
restore the balance, in which case load must be shed at a cost of
X = πx · (t − r). The function X(t, r, s, n) is therefore piecewise
constant in s.
The discontinuities along the s-coordinate occur where the
system transitions from a fault that is contained to one that
leads to islanding followed by involuntary load shedding. Because
there is at most one such transition for a given SPS outcome, the
discontinuities can be labelled by the set slm/n where the pair (l,m)
defines the post-SPS scenario as before. The implication is that the
minimum of X(t, r, s∗, n) with respect to s is attained at one of
these discontinuities, or at the domain boundaries of s: {s, s}. We
will refer to this set of possible values of s as ‘‘candidate solutions’’.
The value slm/n can be interpreted as the SPS capacity that just
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generation, protection and loss-of-load components. Different curves correspond to different reliability levels: black: 80%; red: 95%; blue: 99% (communications availability);
green: 100% availability of all components. The dashed line corresponds to the ‘N-d’ security standard. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)prevents load shedding for a loss of load of l lines followed by the
response ofm-out-of-n generators. This statement has a significant
implication: the optimal SPS configuration is always one that just
prevents cascading overloads in a particular outcome scenario.
Table 7 summarises the final set of candidate solutions in our
example. Theminimumcost solution (bold) is achieved using three
generators (n = 3), committing 1500 MW in total. Specifically,
this configuration corresponds to the solution ss2/3 in which the
system just remains within the transfer limits if one line is lost
and one out of three generators fails to trip. This corresponds to an
overprovision of 500MWof intertripping capacity to hedge against
SPS malfunction. Note that a candidate solution may implicitly
include prevention against overloading in other scenarios. For
example, the candidate solution ss2/3 also implies that there isTable 7
Properties of candidate solutions.
n Solution label Included scenarios s (MW) P + X (£/h)
1 ss1/1 ∅ 1000 188500
2 ss2/2 ∅ 1000 235800
3 s
s
3/3 ∅ 1000 280700
ss2/3 (s, 3) 1500 149900
4 s
s
4/4 ∅ 1000 323200
ss3/4 (s, 4) 1334 155600
0 s ∅ 0 1092000
no cascading when one line is lost and all three generators are
successfully disconnected (s, 3).
We apply this analysis to the co-optimised dispatch and SPS
configurations shown in Figs. 5 and 6. Fig. 9. shows the sequence of
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number of generators selected n. Bottom: intertripping capacity (s). Different
curves correspond to different reliability levels: black: 80%; red: 95%; blue: 99%
(communications availability); green: 100% availability of all components. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
selected candidate solutions as a function of availablewind output.
Firstly, these results confirm that optimal operational solutions are
always part of a finite set of candidate solutions defined by the
different SPS outcomes. Inspection of the selected outcomes for
unreliable SPS shows three regimes: for low wind power output
levels, the SPS is not armed (s); for intermediate levels, the SPS is
configured to prevent islanding for double line outages, assuming
the SPS works correctly (sdn/n); for very high wind output levels,
the SPS only fully protects against a single line outage, but with
a degree of redundancy (ssm/n, withm < n).
6. Conclusions and future work
This paper provides insights into the challenges involved in
formulating and solving the problem of balancing benefits and
risks associated with unreliable SPS for efficient power system
operation. The fundamental characteristics of the problem were
captured in a risk-based cost–benefit framework based on a three-
stage decomposition of the power system response to faults;
each stage contributes to the objective function of a risk neutral
operator. One of these contributions is the expected cost of load
shedding. In a general setting, computing this cost will require
the analysis of complex cascading pathways. This will typically
prevent the formulation of an algebraic optimisation problem and
necessitate the use of heuristic optimisation methods.
By focusing on a simple four-node exemplar network, we
were able to derive a closed-form expression for the optimisation
problem (32), which enabled us to investigate the properties of
the optimal dispatch/SPS configurations in detail. The analysisFig. 7. Power transfer in the corridor for the optimal dispatch solution, for different
values of SPS reliability and two weather conditions, as a function of available
wind output. Different curves correspond to different reliability levels: black: 80%;
red: 95%; blue: 99% (communications availability); green: 100% availability of
all components. The dashed line corresponds to the ‘N-d’ security standard. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
reveals that even SPS with a high probability to malfunction can
produce large operational cost savings with respect to the ‘N-d’
security standard, by reducing constraint costs. This is especially
true in good weather scenarios (low fault rate), where the optimal
generator dispatch was insensitive to SPS performance. For higher
fault rates (e.g. bad weather conditions), the savings with respect
to ‘N-d’ are still substantial, but depend more sensitively on SPS
dependability. In some cases, additional intertripping capacity is
committed to hedge against partial malfunctioning of the SPS.
However, the precise optimal operational decisions depend in non-
trivial ways on model parameters, even for the minimal system
analysed in this paper, thus illustrating the inherent complexity in
finding optimal solutions using heuristic means.
However, the identification of ‘candidate solutions’ in Sec-
tion 5.2 may help such methods to search the solution space more
efficiently. We have observed that the optimal operational strate-
gies precisely prevent expensive involuntary load shedding for one
SPS outcome scenario (fully operational or partial failure). This
property may then be used to select starting points for heuristic
optimisation, or to restrict the search space. The authors are cur-
rently researching such approaches to the operation of large scale
power systems with unreliable SPS.
The SPS dependability block model described in this paper is
generic, and is easily applied to more complex protection schemes
that feature a variety of responses, including load and topology
changes. In future work, the SPS model can also be extended
to include security-based failures (accidental tripping). Finally, it
should be noted that the combined model of power system and
J.L. Calvo et al. / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 8 (2016) 98–110 109Fig. 8. Expected protection and lost load costs depending on capacity committed
and number of generators selected. Labels for the discontinuities show the relation
to the set of post-SPS scenarios. The green circles show the location of theminimum
for each panel. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)Fig. 9. Optimal candidate solutions for different values of SPS reliability. Different
curves correspond to different reliability levels: black: 80%; red: 95%; blue: 99%
(communication channel availability). (For interpretation of the references to colour
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
SPS is a compact example of a cyber–physical system. Although
generalmethods for the reliability analysis of such systems are still
elusive, the findings described in this paper may contribute to the
development this research area.
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